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NOTES
AIRCRAFT-CLLISION IN MIDAIR-INSTRUCTIONS-DANGEROUS INSTRU-
MENTALITY-APPLICATION OF FEDERAL AIR TRAFFIC RULES.-[New York] In
the recent case of Herrick, Olsen et al. v. Curtiss Flying Service Inc. and
Byrnes,1 Olsen, a part owner of the Interstate Air Service Co., was receiv-
ing instructions from Herrick, an employer of the above company and a
transport pilot, when they collided in midair with a plane flown by Byrnes.
The latter possessed a student pilot's license and was flying "solo" at the
time, under the direction of the Curtiss Flying Service, Inc. Olsen, in
contrast, had no license. The planes crashed at an altitude of 400 to 500
feet in the vicinity of Mitchell Field, Long Island. The three airmen
brought separate actions for personal injuries, joining the owners of the
respective planes. The owners, on the other hand, instituted proceedings
for damages to their planes, the Interstate Air Service (plaintiff) by sep-
arate action and the Curtiss Flying Service (defendant) by counterclaim.
The actions were consolidated and tried simultaneously.
The court instructed the jury (1) that the fundamental rules govern-
ing automobile cases furnish criteria to control aviation; (2) that a duty
arises by reason of the possibilities of danger; (3) that "reasonable care,"
the flexible means of determining the violation of the duty, was to be a
standard apropos to aviation (pilots are "required to use a high degree of
care, which would be the care that the great mass of men so circumstanced
as they, would ordinarily use") ; (4) that the Federal Air Traffic Rules ap-
lied; (5) that violations of various giving way, crossing, overtaking and
landing rules, 2 were not evidence of negligence, but merely "questions which
the jury may take into consideration in determining whether [there] . .
was negligence"; (6) that such violation to merit consideration had to be
the proximate cause of the accident; (7) that an aircraft is not an in-
herently dangerous instrumentality but becomes dangerous only by reason
of careless operation; (8) that the Curtiss Flying Service was to be held
liable if they failed to exercise reasonable care commensurable with the
dangers involved, from the use by the student; (9) that the Curtiss Com-
pany was not in the position of master and servant, but, since they were
required to instruct their students as to the traffic regulations, they would
be made a party to the student's violations of traffic regulations, if ignor-
'ance of such rules was the proximate cause of the injury.
The jury favored the defendants, returning a verdict of $500 for the
Curtiss Flying Service on their counterclaim, and $3500 for Byrnes on his
1. Not officially reported. New York Supreme Court, Nassau County,
June 27, 1932; 1932 U. S. Av. R. 110.
2. Air Commerce Regulations, 1928, Chap. VII, See. 74(a), (c), (d), (f),
Sec. 75(d). 1928 U. S. Av. R. 402, 408.
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cross-action. A motion for a new trial was dismissed. The judge how-
ever suggested and encouraged an appeal to be taken.
The judge in the above case formed his instructions with special dili-
gence by reason of the case being one of first impression in America.
Although it has not as yet reached final determination, it contains two
interesting features that warrant discussion at this time.
I. Possibly for the first time we discover a definite judicial pronounce-
ment that aeroplanes are not inherently dangerous. This position is feasible
in view of the utility of aviation and the rapid mechanical strides that have
already been made. If a plane were labeled a dangerous instrumentality,
absolute liability would result; the owner would become an insurer. Some-
thing may be said for absolute liability when the injured party is one not
engaged in aerial maneuvers. But when both parties are piloting or are
connected with the navigation of a plane, liability must be based on the
doctrine of negligence.3 In the instant case the question of the dangerous
nature of the plane was raised as a means of imposing liability upon the
owner of the ship. This theory accrues as a logical extension of the
"danger test" for the discovery of the existence of a duty.4 The more
dangerous the character of the vehicle, the greater its liability to do injury
to others and the higher the degree of care and caution to be exercised
by the person charged with the duty of its operation.5
An early writer in air law has advocated the application of the doc-
trine of Rylands v. Fletcher6 to aviation.7 To Mr. Hazeltine, the dangers
incident to aerial activities are greater than the dangers of storing water.
His opinion seems to be predicated upon the famous case of Guille v.
Swan.8 That case concerned a balloon which descended into the plain-
tiff's garden. Two hundred people gathered around to rescue the occu-
pant. Their joyous missionary work resulted in much damage to plaintiff's
garden. The balloonist was held absolutely liable not only for damages
he himself caused, but also for damages occasioned by those who assisted
him. The balloon was thought to be a dangerous instrumentality by reason
of its being unmanageable. When once it goes up, it is bound to come
down somewhere, but where?
The doctrine thus announced has not been extended. At the time Mr.
Hazeltine wrote, aeronautics was crude. With advance in the science there
has come liberality of thought as to the imposition of liability. An appro-
priate quotation reads:
. . . today aircraft cannot be classified as a dangerous instrumentality
in the legal acceptance of the phrase. Flying has now become too common
and relatively too safe to admit of such a label. Indeed it is doubtful if
3. Nokes & Bridges, The Law of Aviation (1930), p. 105.
4. Brett, M. R., in Heaven v. Pender 11 Q. B. D. 503 (1883):
whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard
to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think would at once
recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct
with. regard to those circumstances he would cause danger or injury to the
person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill
to avoid such danger." Cf. Green, Judge and Jury (1930), pp. 65-74.
5. Graham v. Hagman, 270 II. 252, 110 N. E. 337 (1915) ; Weil v. Kreut-
zer, 134 Ky. 563, 121 S. W. 471 (1909) ; Commonwealth v. Hofofall, 213 Mass.
232, 100 N. E. 362 (1913); Bryant v. Grizan Valley Oil Co., 163 S. E. 773
(W. Va., 1932).
6. L. R., 3 H. L. 330 (1868-Eng.).
7. Hazeltine. Law of the Air (1913), pp. 86, 87.
8. 19 Johns 381 (1822).
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any court today would follow the doctrine of Guille v. Swan for the rea-
sons expressed in the opinion."O
The instructions in the case under discussion make reference to the
law of automobiles to ascertain aerial ability. In regard to the danger-
ous nature of mechanical transportation contrivances, the analogy to auto-
mobiles is fertile.10 During the development stage of automobile travel,
occasional instances appear where the motor driven vehicle is looked upon
as a dangerous instrumentality. An example appears in a statute of Great
Britain requiring a motor vehicle to travel at a speed not exceeding four
miles an hour and to be proceeded by a man bearing a red flag."l There
are a few cases in America that seem to extend liability to owners of
automobiles on the ground that they are dangerous instrumentalities. In
Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson,12 the court recognized that human
intervention is necessary to make automobiles dangerous; still it was ready
to call them inherently dangerous. The decision was enforced by reason of
statutes which regulate automobile activity on the basis of their being
dangerous. The reasoning, thus adopted, besides being very unsatisfactory,
is obiter dictum. The court upon a rehearing admitted that liability would
attach without necessitating the label of an automobile as inherently danger-
ous. In Weil v. Kreutzer,13 an automobile was held to be more dangerous
than a street car. Street cars and locomotives are inherently dangerous.
In another situation regulations of automobiles were challenged as being
discriminatory. They were constitutionally upheld on the ground that they
frightened horses and therefore increased the dangers of travel.14
An automobile, however, by the great weight of authority is at present
not a dangerous instrumentality or dangerous per se.1 5 That is to say, it
is not in the same category as dynamite or ferocious animals which do not
require human intervention to effect injuries, nor of locomotives which
are ponderous machines incapable of precise handling, and subject to many
statutory obligations.16 The dangers result from the personal element in
motoring rather than from the very nature of the vehicle.17 "It is not
the ferocity of automobiles that is to be feared but the ferocity of those
who drive them."is
The distinction thus drawn between an instrument dangerous in its
very nature and dangerous only as a result of human handling has been
9. Hotchkiss, Aviation Law (1928), Sec. 30, p. 40.
10. Hotchkiss, op cit., Sec. 33; Zollmann, Law of the Air (1927), Sec.
107, Uniform State Law of Aeronautics, Sec. 6.
11. Berry, Law of Automobiles (4th ed., 1924). pp. 8, 9.
12. 80 Fla. 441, 86 S. 629 (1920).
13. 134 Ky. 563, 121 S. W. 471 (1909).
14. Christy V. Elliott, 216 Ill. 31, 74 N. E. 1035 (1905); Commonwealth
V. Kingsbury, 199 Mass. 542, 85 N. E. 848 (1908).
15. Martin v. Lilly, 188 Ind. 139, 121 N. E. 443 (1919) Whitelock v.
Dennis, 139 Md. 557, 116 Atl. 68 (1921) ; McGowan v. Longwood, 242 Mass.
337, 136 N. E. 76 (1922) ; Hartley v. Miller, 165 Mich. 115, 130 N. W. 336(1911) ; Elliott v. Harding, 107 Ohio St. 501, 140 N. E. 338 (1923) ; Cooley
on Torts (4th ed., 1932), Vol. III, Sec. 506, p. 493.
16. Felder v. Davidson, 139 Ga. 509, 77 S. E. 618 (1913) ; Premier Motor
Mfg. Co. v. Tilford, 61 Ind. Ap. 164, 111 N. E. 645 (1916) ; Danforth v. Fisher,
75 N. H. 111, 71 Atl. 535 (1908) ; Vincent V. Candall-Godley & Co., 131 App.
Div. 200, 115 N. Y. S. 600 (1909) Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. Derby, 14
How (U. S.) 468, 14 L. Ed. 502 (1852).
17. Parker v. Wilson, 179 Ala. 361, 60 S. 150 (1912) ; Tyler v. Stephen's
Adm'r., 163 Ky. 770, 174 S. W. 790 (1915) ; Stapleton v. Independent Brew-
ing Co., 198 Mich. 170, 164 N. W. 520 (1917).
18. Lewis v. Amorus, 3 Ga. Ap. 50, 59 S. E. 338, 340 (1907).
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called legal sophistry.19 The distinction is similar to that made between
instruments inherently and imminently dangerous. While it is often diffi-
cult to categorically place activity on one or the other side of any line
of demarcation, based upon degrees of judgment, yet the distinction may
profitably serve in the placing of liability. In the automobile setup, an
owner is not liable for injuries caused by someone who is using his ma-
chine unless he is in the position of master to a servant, and the servant
is acting within his employ. 20 The owner of an instrument inherently
dangerous is subject to a more severe measure of liability.21 When pos-
sessed of such property, he owes a duty to keep it within his control. He
may be held for injuries by a servant even when not in the performance
of his master's duties.2 2 Even though an automobile has been extracted
from the dangerous instrumentality class, nevertheless it is an instrument
with dangerous propensities. It is likely to cause injuries if not used rea-
sonably, and in that respect is imminently dangerous. If intrusted to a
person whom the owner knows or should know is incompetent, liability
will then transcend the negligent person and in addition be attached to the
owner of the machine. 2 8
When an automobile is defective so as to be made unmanageable, the
resultant owner's liability will follow.2 4 A defective wheel was the basis
for imposition of liability upon a manufacturer even though not a party
to a contract of sale.26 The machine by reason of the defect became in-
herently dangerous.
In the instant case, the court rightly instructed the jury that an aero-
plane was not a dangerous instrumentality. The result is to shift some
of the risk of aviation from the owner to the operator. It also prevents
the fastening of an undesirable precedent, in view of the assurance of
future progress in aviation. Liability could still be placed upon the owner
if he permitted an incompetent individual to operate under unfavorablt
conditions or circumstances.20 If the analogy to automobile travel is
valid, and I think it is, then reason certainly justifies the result. "Surely
the smoothly gliding aeroplane on its unobstructed roadbed of air is no
more a dangerous piece of machinery than is the deadly automobile on
the highly congested thoroughfare."27
II. Secondly, the instructions contain thq first judicial expression
wherein a state applied the Federal Air Traffic Rules in state activity.
The judge attempts to place the reason for this judicial adoption upon
constitutional grounds by saying the rules were in aid of interstate com-
merce and that a government field was being utilized. The obvious neces-
sity of having traffic rules to govern aerial activity seems to be the real
basis for the court's acceptance of the Federal Rules. New York, at the
time the accident occurred, had not passed any state air traffic regulations.
19. Barmore v. Vicksburg S. & P. Ry. Co., 85 Miss. 426, 38 S. 210 (1905).
But cf. dissent.
20. Parker v. Wilson, cit. note 17; Martin v. Lilly, cit. note 15; White-
look v. Dennis, cit. note 15; Danforth v. Fisher, cit. note 16.
21. Southern Cotton Co. v. Anderson, Phila. 6 Reading Riy. Co. v. Derby,
cit. note 16.
22. Felder v. Davidson, cit. note 16 ; Tyler v. Stephen's Adm'r., cit. note 17.
23. Elliott v. Harding, cit. note 15; Parker v. Wilson, cit. note 17.
24. Texas Co. v. Veloz, 162 S. W. 377 (Tex., Ct. of Civ. App., 1913).
25. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 10k0 (1916).26. Graham v. Hagman, cit. note 5; note 23, supra.
27. Zotlmann, op. cit. note 10, Sec. 113.
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The application of the federal rules was further facilitated by a prevailing
custom in consonance with those rules.
It has been pointed out that the simple rules of the road are not suffi-
cient for aeronautic activity. The definite limits upon air maneuvering
without suffering a "fall," furnishes the reason.28 A more complicated set
of rules was needed and was supplied first by the United States Secretary
of Commerce2 9 and then by various state commissions who were given that
power by the legislatures. 8o
Many have expressed a desire to have uniform traffic rules. "Con-
flicting rules instead of preventing collisions would tend to produce them."81
Congress has authorized the Secretary of Commerce to promulgate air
traffic rules ". . . as to safe altitude of flight and rules for the preven-
tion of collisions between vessels and aircraft."32 The Federal Air Traffic
Rules that were thereby prescribed assume to cover various phases of
flying. They would seem to cover all flying to which the rules apply,
whether interstate or intrastate, in order to prevent undue burdens upon
interstate and foreign commerce.83 Operators in the field have acceded to
the application of these federal rules. State legislatures have recognized
their effect by authorizing administrative bodies to prescribe rules and
regulations that shall conform and coincide with the federal rules.3 4 Fed-
eral regulations have by several states been incorporated into state legis-
lation by reference.8 5  Incorporation by reference would tend to indicate
that federal rules of themselves are not applicable within state jurisdiction.
The practice however certainly shows a desire for uniformity of regulations.
The court in the instant case rightly ruled that the federal rules were
applicable. Certain phases of aviation should only be subject to one cen-
tral regulatory body. Air traffic rules, in the absence of local peculiarities,
seem to require such unified control. At present, centralization in the fed-
eral government appears as the only possibility. In New York where the
case now being discussed arose there was not any air traffic rules until
193036 Under such circumstances the federal rules should certainly be
applied.
28. Zollmann, op. cit., See. 68,.p. 50.
29. Air Commerce Regulations, 1928, Sec. 74, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 402.
30. Cahill's Ill. Revised Stat. (1931), Chap. 5a, See. 10: Air Traffic
Rules of Illinois Aeronautic Commission.
31. Zollmann, op cit. note 10, Sec. 68, p. 51.
32. Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. L. 568, Sec. 3, Subs. (e), 1928
U. S. Av. R. 333.
33. Fixel, The Law of Aviation (1927), pp. 108-115.
34. Ala., L. 1931, No. 739, Sec. 2, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 311; Alaska, L. 1929,
Ch. 75. Sec. 3, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 393; Idaho, L. 1931, Ch. 145, See. 3(e), 1931
U. S. Av. R. 338 ; Ky., L. 1930, Ch. 11, Sec. 6, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 391 (identical
with federal rules); Me., L. 1929, Ch. 265, Sec. 3, See. 6, Sec. 7, 1929 U. S.
Av. R. 574; Md., L. 1929, -Oh. 318, Sec. 15, See. 19, Sec. 21, 1929 U. S. Av. R.
580; Minn., L. 1929, Ch. 290, Secs. 5-7, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 629; Neb., L. 1929,
Ch. 34, Sec. 7, 1919 U. S. Av. R. 661 (duty placed upon commissioner) ; N. H.
L. 1929, Ch. 182, See. 7, Sec. 8, 1929 U. S. Av. t. 670; N. T., L. 1931, Ch.
190, Sec. 7, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 403 ; N. M.. L. 1929, Ch. 71, Sec. 7, 1929 U. S.
Av. t. 689; N. D., L. 1929, Ch. 85, See. 2, 1929 U. S. Av. Ft. 711; Tenn., U.
1931, Ch. 73, Sec. 2, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 454; Vt., L. 1931, No. 126, Sec. 2, 1931
U. S. Av. Bt 464; Va., L. 1930, Ch. 291, Sec. 3775-b, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 505.
35. Idaho, L. 1929, Ch. 137, Sec. 2(f), 1929 U. S. Av. R. 493 (marking
and Identification of air navigation facilities) ; Kansas. L. 1931, Ch. 6, Sec. 3,
1931 U. S. Av. Ft. 359 (Violation of federal regulations subject to prosecution) ;
Michigan, L. 1929, No. 177, Sec. 2, 1929 U. S. Av. t. 608 (Board may deviate
therefrom however when deemed necessary for public safety) ; Rhode Island,
L. 1929, Ch. 1435, Sec. 13, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 802; Washington, L, 1929, Ch.
157, Sec. 5, 1929 U. S. Av. t. 862; West Virginia, L. 1931, Ch. 4, Sec. 2, 1931
U. s. Av. R. 468 ; Wisconsin, L. 1929, Ch. 348, Sec. 114.21, 1929 U. S. Av. t.
878.
86. N. Y., L. 1930, Ch. 289.
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There has been a controversy centered on the question of federal or
state jurisdiction over aeronautics. It is submitted that an enlightened
judicial attitude such as achieved in the instant case may be a means of
realizing uniformity under federal supervision, without necessitating legis-
lative intervention. The relief thus afforded is minimized however by the





ana] Defendants are the owners and operators of a carnival. One of
the advertised attractions was a balloon ascension and parachute jump-
the balloon being so constructed that the gas was released and the balloon
fell, without control, after the aeronaut had left it. While the defendant's
show was operating near plaintiff's residence, and on the day and at the
time of such a balloon ascension, a balloon fell on plaintiff's house, caus-
ing damages. Plaintiff sued to recover these damages, alleging that the
balloon was operated by, and under the direction of, the defendants. De-
fendants admitted that a balloon ascension was advertised by them, but
alleged that it was conducted by an independent contractor and denied
that the balloon which fell on plaintiff's house was owned by them or that
it was sent up by them or by any of their agents or employees. At the
trial, plaintiffs offered no evidence to connect defendants with the balloon
in question and a judgment was entered against them-defendants offering
no evidence. Plaintiffs now claim that their failure of proof was due to
a misapprehension, caused by a "misreading" of the answer, that defendants
had admitted their connection with the balloon, and, therefore, that they
should have been granted either a new trial or a non-suit: Held: that
the absolute judgment for defendants was proper. Lansing v. Miller, 140
So. 79, 1932 U. S. Av. Rep. 45 (La. App. 1932).
On the narrow ground on which the decision is placed, the case is
clearly correct, since the plaintiffs, as the court points out, failed to show
even that the balloon was the one which, admittedly, ascended from de-
fendant's grounds., There is, however, some language in the opinion which
seems to indicate that the defendants were free from liability for damage
caused by a balloon operated by an independent contractor.2 This is a prob-
lem which has received some attention by the courts in previous similar
cases. In most of the early balloon ascension cases, the injuries complained
of occurred on the grounds of the defendant and liability was predicated
on the theory that there had been a failure to provide proper safeguards,
without regard to whether or not the aeronaut was an employee or an in-
dependent contractor 3 A few cases, however, have involved accidents to
1. "For aught that the testimony shows, this balloon may have come
from a great distance and may not have ascended from the defendants' show
grounds." 140 So. 79, 80 (La. App. 1932).
2. "In fact . . . the outstanding contention (in the answer) is that
the balloon was owned and operated by an independent contractor in such a
manner as to free defendants from all liability for any accidents that might
happen in connection therewith."
3. Peckett v. Bergen Beach Co., 44 App. Div. 559, 60 N. Y. S. 966, 1928
U. S. Av. Rep. 99 (1899) ; Roper v. Ulster County Agric. Soc., 136 App. Div.
97, 120 N. Y. S. 644, 1928 U. S. Av. Rep. 102 (1909); Platt v. Brie Countli
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persons near the aviation field. In the early case of Canney v. Rochester
Agricultural and Mechanical Association4 the facts closely paralleled those
alleged in the instant case and the court held the operator of the show
liable, on the ground that one who contracts for work which is likely to
cause damage to others cannot evade responsibility by employing an in-
dependent contractor 5 and that to send up a balloon which was to be al-
lowed to fall without control was an inherently dangerous enterprise. It
is submitted that this is the better view. It does not at all imply any
absolute liability, but merely imposes on the person directly responsible
for, and securing the financial benefit from, the flight liability for damage
which he must (or should have) foreseen and prevents him from insulating
himself from that liability by the imposition of an "independent contractor"
-frequently judgment proof.
ROBERT KINGSLEY.
AIRPORTS-CONDEMNATION-ELECTRIC POWER LINE-POTENTIAL USE OF
ADJACENT LAND AS AIRPoRT.-[Illinois] The plaintiff electric company sued
to condemn certain lands for a transmission line. In these lands one de-
fendant had the life estate and another the remainder. Defendants in a
cross-petition asked damages for adjacent land not taken on the ground
that the construction of the power line would destroy the potential use
of the land as an airport, a use for which it was peculiarly fitted. For
damages to these fifty-eight acres the jury gave the defendants $3300. The
plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court. Held: reversed and remanded.
Rockford Electric Company v. Browman, 339 Ill. 212, 171 N. E. 189 (1930).
The error of the lower court in instructing the jury that they might
consider the potential use of the land as an airport in determining damages
was, apparently, the main reason for the reversal of the case. Since the
enactment of the Constitution of 1870 damages have been granted in Illi-
nois for injury to adjacent property as well as for the taking of the prop-
erty condemned.1 But "the provision in the Constitution of 1870 was not
intended to reach every possible injury"; there must be "some direct phy-
sical disturbance of a right, either public or private, which the plaintiff en-
joys in connection with his property and which gives it an additional value,
and by reason of such disturbance," he must have "sustained a special
damage with respect to his property in excess of that sustained by the
public generally.2 Nor should there be an allowance for "imaginative or
speculative damages or such remote and inappreciable ones as the imagina-
tion can conjure up as liable to happen in the future"; rather "the dam-
Agric. Soc., 164 App. Dlv. 99, 149 N. Y. S. 520, 1928 U. S. Av. Rep. 116 (1914) ;
Smith v. Cumberland Agric. Soc., 163 N. C. 346, 79 S. E. 632. 1928 U. S. Av.
Rep. 112 (1913) ; Richmond & M. Ry. v. Moore's Admr., 94 Va. 493, 27 S. E.
70. 30 L. R. A. 258, 1928 U. S. Av. Rep. 86 (1897) ; contra: Smith v. Benick,
87 Md. 610, 41 Atl. 56, 1928 U. S. Av. Rep. 90 (1898).
4. 76 N. H. 60, 79 At. 517, 1928 U. S. Av. Rep. 105 (1911) ; and consult:
Scott's Trustee v. Moss., 17 Ct. of Sess. (4th Ser.) 32 (Scot. 1889).
5. Consult: Bigelow on Torts (8th ed. 1907), Ill, pp. 143-146; Burdick,
Law of Torts (4th ed. 1926), §§136-138, pp. 174-178; Cooley. Law of Torts(Throckmorton's Student's ed. 1930), §343, pp. 692-693; Pollock, Law of Torts(12th ed. 1923), pp. 530-533.
1. Rigney v. City of Chi., 102 Ill. 64 (1882).
2. Ill. Power & Light Corp. v. Talbot, 321 Ill. 538, 547, 152 N. E. 486
(1926).
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ages must be direct and proximate and not such as are merely possible
or may be conceived by conjecture or surmise."
The Illinois Supreme Court has previously held that in a breach of
contract action the supposed adaptability of the land for a particular pur-
pose may be considered in assessing damages. 4 In a condemnation proceed-
ing, where the value of the land taken is in question, that land may not be
valued at what it might be worth after a change of use, but its adapta-
bility for a future use and the enhanced worth due to this adaptability
may be one factor in determining its value.5 But the sale price of the
property in the future may never be the proper test of value even though
it is apparent that the property is peculiarly suited to a special use.6 Also,
proof must be limited to showing the use for which the property is natur-
ally adapted; the owner may not show to what use he intended to put the
property.7
The lower court committed other errors, as well as this one, and
there is little doubt that reversal was justified. This is, it seems, the first
case of this kind to reach an appellate court. Undoubtedly there will be
others.
GEORGE W. BALL.
AIRPORTS-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-POWER TO APPROPRIATE FoR,-[Ok-
lahoma] The governing body of the plaintiff city had duly certified to
the defendant Excise Board an item as follows: "Airport Lease, Five
Thousand Dollars." The defendant, claiming to be authorized so to do
under Okla. Comp. Stats. (1921), §9698, struck out the item and the city
brings mandamus proceedings to compel its approval. Held: (three judges
dissenting) (1) The city was authorized by statute to operate an airport'
and the amount herein fixed admittedly was within the statutory and con-
stitutional limits of taxation. (2) The powers given to the Excise Board
must be considered with relation to the distinction between (a) purely
municipal purposes and (b) purpose of a municipal character in which
the State has i sovereign interest.2 As to the former, the Board has no
power to interfere with the discretion of the local authorities as to whether
the expenditure should be made, but has power only to see (a) that the
purpose is one authorized by law and (b) that it was within the tax limits.
Since the item here was within this class, the Board had no power to
strike it out and mandamus should issue. City of Ardmore v. Excise Board
of Carter County, 8 Pac. (2d) 2, [1932] U. S. Av. Rep. 273 (Okla. 1932).
3. So. Ill. & Ky. R. 1. Co. v. Johnson, 321 Ill. 187, 191, 151 N. E. 553(1926); McReynolds v. Burlington & Ohio Iy. Co., 106 Ill. 152 (1883) I.
Central R. R. Co. v. Roskemmer, 264 Ill. 103, 105 N. E. 695 (1914).
4. Dady v. Condit, 209 II. 488, 70 N. E. 1088 (1904).
5. Roek Island & Eastern By. Co. v. Gordon, 184 Ill. 456, 56 N. E. 810(1900) Martin v. C. M. Elec. Ry. Co., 220 Ill. 97, 77 N. E. 86 (1906).
6. Forest Preserve Dist. v. Wallace, 299 Ill. 476, 132 N. E. 444 (1921)
Martin v. C. M. Elec. By. Co., cit. note 5.
7. Pinkham v. Inhabitants of Chelmsford, 109 Mass. 225 (1872); Farmer
V. Stillwater Water Co., 99 Minn. 119, 108 N. W. 824 (1906); Richmond A
Petersburg Elec. RIy. Co. v. Seabaord Air Line Ky., 103 Va. 399, 49 S. E. 512(1905). Contra, see Bailey v. Isle of Thanet St. RIy. Co., 1 Q. B. 722 (1909)(where a lot was bought for a young ladies' school, then taken for railroad
purposes, and it was held that the intended use might properly be considered).
1. Okla. Comp. Stats. (1921), §4507, as amended by Okla. Laws of 1929,
C. 11, p. 10.
2. Thurston V. Caldwell, 40 Okla. 206, 137 Pac. 683.
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The holding herein that the operation of an airport is a "purely mun-
icipal" function is in accord with the earlier cases from other jurisdictions
holding that a municipal airport is a "proprietary" function exposing the
municipality to liability in tort.8
ROBERT KINGSLEY.
AIReORTs-NuIsANCES.-[California] Plaintiff, the owner of suburban
property on the outskirts of the city of Los Angeles, sued the city of
Santa Monica as owner of adjacent property on which an airport was
located. She alleged that defendant owner had leased its property to per-
sons engaged in commercial aviation, resulting in the impairment of the
peaceful enjoyment of her premises. Planes flying over her property at
an altitude as low as 100 feet, noise, dust and refuse, parachute jumps,
forced landings on her farm, and the entrance thereon of persons attracted
by the airport constituted the nuisance. Defendant demurred. Held:
Demurrer sustained. The allegations were insufficient to impose liability
upon the landlord. Meloy v. City of Santa Monica, 70 Cal. App. 179, 12
P. (2d) 1072, 1932 U. S. Av. R. 17 (1932).
There are two lines of legal theory available to the courts to support
the imposition of liability upon the landlord for a nuisance maintained upon
his land by a tenant. The first theory is based upon ratification by the
landlord.' It has been suggested that the acceptance of rent for premises
upon which an obnoxious condition is being maintained constitutes a suffi-
cient ratification of the harm.2 The English rule extends liability to the
landlord when he relets after the creation of a nuisance upon the premises
by the tenant, or what is equivalent to a reletting, when he fails to avail
himself of an opportunity to give notice to quit.3 Few American courts
have accepted either of these rules in toto. The American rule requires
ratification to be positive.4 It may, however, in the case of public nuisances
with statutory penalties, consist in mere failure to act, if there was knowledge
of the condition.5
The second theory upon which a landlord may be held responsible is
based upon either the existence of the condition upon the land at the time
of the leasing, or upon the making of the lease in contemplation of a
purpose which would inevitably result in the creation of an obnoxious con-
dition.7  If the possibility of the objectionable use be in the alternative,
3. City of Mobile v. Lartigue, 23 Ala. App. 479, 127 So. 257, 1930 UT. S.
Av. Rep. 50 (1930), discussed in: 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 365 (1930); 27
Va. L. Rev. 81 (1930) ; Coleman v. City of Oakland, 110 Cal. App. 715, 295
Pac. 59, 1931 U. S. Av. Rep. 61 (1930), discussed In: 4 So. Cal. L. Rev. 316(1931) ; 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 436 (1931) ; 2 Air L. Rev. 285 (1931) ; Mollen-
cop v. City of Salem, 8 Pac. (2d) 783, 1932 U. S. Av. Rep. 22 (Ore. 1932),
discussed in: 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 467 (1932).
1. Rider v. Clark, 132 Cal. 382, 64 Pac. 564 (1901).
2. 1 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant (2nd ed. 1910), p. 686.
3. Wood!all, Law of Landlord and Tenant (22nd ed. 1927), p. 917;
Gandy v. Jubber, 5 Best & S. 78 (1864).
4. Keenan v. New Hanover County Commnrs., 156 N. C. 356, 83 S. E.
556 (1914); City of Omaha v. Murphy Construction Co., 114 Neb. 583, 208
N. W. 667 (1926).
5. State v. Emerson. 90 Wash. 565, 155 Pac. 579 (1916).
6. Kallis v. Shattuck, 69 Cal. 593, 11 Pac. 346 (1886) ; Gandy V. Jubber.
supra; City of Chicago v. Atwood, 269 Ill. 624, 110 N. E. 127 (1915).
7. Baker v. Gates, 279 Mo. 630, 216 S. E. 775 (1919) ; Bd. of Freeholders
v. Woodcliffe Land Improvement Co., 74 N. J. Law 355, 65 A. 844 (1907).
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and the condition arise through acts of the tenant which are not essential
to the purpose of the lease, the tenant alone is liable.8
In order to determine if a lease for the purposes of an airport con-
templates an obnoxious use of the premises, inquiry must be directed to
the question whether the ordinary conduct of an airport constitutes a
nuisance per se. There are but few cases on this point. In these cases
the courts have refused to answer the query in the affirmative, preferring
to utilize in their investigations the criterion of a fair and reasonable use
of the premises under the circumstances. 9  State regulations concerning
airports have been regarded as an implied recognition of their right to
exist, especially those statutes enabling municipalities to condemn land,
under eminent domain, for the purpose of establishing airports.1o There
seems to be a tendency toward a method of approach which comprehends
a recognition of the necessity of some adjustment on the part of surround-
ing landowners, in the interests of progress, supplemented by the adjoining
of objectionable practices which are not essential to the conduct of the
ariport.11 It must be added that the United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in the Swetland case enjoined the maintenance of the airport alto-
gether, but that action was not a rejection of the partial injunction method
adopted by the lower court; it was a difference of opinion as to the pos-
sible extent of the adjustment. In the Gay case, the plaintiff hospital
obtained an injunction restraining the operation of the airport. Under the
circumstances of that case there could be no adjustment at all. Any of the
functions of the airport prevented the use of the hospital; one had to
cease. The court placed the burden upon the late comer. But even this
case denied the fundamental nuisance character of the airport, and pro-
ceeded upon the unusual facts above set out. The cases support the con-
clusion that an airport as an enterprise has a right to exist; it is only the
unusual circumstances of operation and environs that render it a nuisance.
Plaintiff, in the instant case, seeking to hold the landlord liable for the
obnoxious acts of his tenant, without alleging their indispensability to the
proper conduct of the airport itself, was waging battle against the weight
of authority.
A supplementary question, indirectly introduced by the case, is whether
a landlord may be liable at all for trespasses committed by his tenant off
the leased property. The well established rule that continued trespasses
constitute an abatable nuisance settles the question.
ROBERT L. GROVER.
8. Lucid v. Citizens' Investment Co., 48 Cal. App. 257, 193 Pac. 161
(1920).
9. Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N. E. 385,
1930 U. S. Av. R. 1 (1930), Comment, 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 82 (1931) ;
Glatt v. Page (Dist. Ct., 3d Jud. Dist. of Neb., Docket 93-115, 1928), cited in
Lowell, "Who Is Owner of the Air Above the Land," 1 Aircraft Age 22 (1929),
cited in Wenneman, Municipal Airports, p. 277, cited in Sweeney, "Adjusting
the Conflicting Interests of Landowners and Aviators in Anglo-American Law,"
3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 337 (1932) ; Swetland v. Curtiss Airport Corp. (C. C.
A. 6th, 1931), 55 F. (2d) 201, 1932 U. S. Av. R. 1, Comment, 3 JOURNAL OF
AIR LAW 293 (1932); Gay et at. and Rush Hospital v. Taylor et al. (C. P.
Chester County, Pa., Sept. 8, 1932).
10. City of Spokane v. Williams, 157 Wash. 32, 288 Paa. 258, 1932 U. S.
Av. R. 71 (1930); Elliott, "Unobstructed Airport Approaches," 3 JOURNAL OF
Am LAW 207 (1932); contra, Gay et al. and Rush Hospital v. Taylor et al.,
supra (license from the Aeronautical Commission).
11. Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., supra (unnecessarily low flying
over adjoining property; Swetland V. Curtiss Airport Corp. (Dist. Ct. N. D.
Ohio, 1930) 41 F. (2d) 929, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 21 (the raising of great clouds
of dust) ; Ibid (strewing of handbills).
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GASOLINE TAX-COMMERCE-STATE TAX ON GASOLINE USED IN INTER-
STATE COMMERCE.-[Federal] A Wyoming statute provided that all funds
received from the tax on gasoline used at any municipal air field should
be paid over to the city owning such air field for the maintenance and
improvement of the airport.1 The plaintiff, engaged in interstate air trans-
portation, had previously contracted with the cities of Cheyenne and Rock
Springs, Wyoming, for the use of their municipal landing fields. The
plaintiff brought suit to enjoin collection of the tax and the trial court dis-
missed the bill. Held: on appeal, that the facts were substantially the same
as in the case of Eastern Air Transport, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Com-
inission,2 that the tax on gasoline purchased in Wyoming was valid, and
that the collection of the tax on gasoline procured by the plaintiff outside
the State of Wyoming should be enjoined. Boeing Air Transport, Inc. v.
Edelnan, 61 F. (2d) 319 (C. C. A., 10th, Wyoming, Oct. 4, 1932).
The tax on the sale of gasoline within the state, although the gasoline
is intended to be used as fuel for interstate commerce, is not such a
burden on that commerce that it violates the Constitution of the United
States.3
The Wyoming statute did not impair the obligations of the plaintiff's
contract with the municipalities. If the sole ground for sustaining the tax
had been a charge for the use of the landing fields, it would have been an
interference with contract rights, but the validity of the tax does not rest
upon that basis. Whether the proceeds of the revenue measure are used
for the improvement of airports or highways is of no concern to the
plaintiff so long as the tax is levied for a public purpose.4
RAYMOND I. SUEKOFF.
NEGLIGENCE-CARRIERS-DUTY OF AN AIR CARRIER TO PROVIDE SAFE PLACE
FOR DISCHARGE OF PASSENGERS-STRIKING OF PASSENGER BY PROPELLER.-
[Texas] A recent case from the court of civil appeals of Texas is the
first of its type to be reported and the second to reach an appellate court.
It involves the question of duty owed by an air carrier to its passengers in
the disembarking of the passengers and their safe conduct from the aircraft
to the hangar. In this case one Williamson was a passenger in a plane
flying from Abilene to Dallas, Texas. When the plane landed at Dallas
it was taxied up to the hangar and stopped facing north, to the east of the
waiting room and hangar. Due to the position of the plane in parking,
it was necessary for the passengers dismounting to walk around the front
or the rear of the plane to get to the hangar. Deceased (Williamson) got
out of the plane, started toward the front of the plane, ducked under a
wing strut and was struck by a propeller. As the plane was to be used
again, the motors had been left idling while the passengers were being dis-
charged. Held: That it was negligence to stop the plane facing in a
northerly direction; that it was negligence to discharge passengers while
the propellers were still in motion; that it was negligence to fail to warn
the deceased of any danger; that the carrier was negligent in failing to
1. Special Session Laws, Wyo., 1929, Ch. 14.
2. 285 U. S. 147, 52 S. Ct. 340 (1932).
3. Eastern Air Transport, Inc. v. S. Car. Tax Comm., cit. note 2. For
a discussion of the distinction between the taxes on "sale" and "use," see
comment, 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 309 (1932)
4. Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (1874).
THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
rope off an area around the propellers; that the carrier was negligent in
failing to have an employee conduct passengers from the plane to the
hangar. The element of contributory negligence put forth by the defendant
was entirely overruled, the court and jury deciding that none of the acts
of the plaintiff constituted negligence. The opinion was, therefore, based
wholly upon the duty of the carrier saying (at page 1048): "It was ap.
pellant's (the carrier's) duty to furnish Williamson a safe place to alight
and a safe egress from its plane to the hangar where he desired to go."
Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc., v. Williamson et al., 51 S. W. (2) 1047,
1932 U. S. Av. R. 133 (Ct. of Civ. App. of Texas, 1932).
The authorities in line with this case are few, and not one of them has
been officially reported. In Berg v. Seitz,1 we have the same factual set-up
except that there the plane in which the injured passenger had been riding
was not on a scheduled run, inasmuch as it w~s being used, at the time the
injury occurred, merely for "hopping" passengers. Counsel for the defense
put forth the argument that this exempted them from the rules applying
to common carriers but the court stated that the duty of the owner of a
plane engaged in "hopping" passengers was no less than that of a carrier
engaged in carrying passengers on scheduled routes. The other facts are
the same, the plane was facing in such a manner that the passenger in
leaving was forced to pass to the front or rear of the plane. Plaintiff
passed to the front and was struck by the propeller. The court in ruling
for the plaintiff said that the carrier was required "to exercise the highest
degree of human care, skill, and foresight consistent with practical opera-
tion of the plane in question. . . . The nature of the conveyance and the
great danger involved would seem to require the utmost practical care
and prudence for the safety of passengers." As in the Williamson case,
the court and jury could find no negligence on the part of the plaintiff
and refused to allow the contributory negligence defense. In the case of
Hough v. Curtiss Flying Service, Inc.,2 we have the same facts except that,
as in the Berg case, the plane was being used for "hopping" passengers.
This case was found for the defendant. The only reasons that can be
given for this are that the case was one of first impression, tried by a
judge without a jury. The prior cases were jury cases. Another case
following this line but distinguishable is Hamilton v. O'Tooles where some
idea is given of what will constitute contributory negligence. The defend-
ant was engaged in "hopping" passengers. The plaintiff had been up for a
flight, and after the plane landed and the pilot was turning it on the apron,
he left the cockpit, stepped forward from the wing to the ground, and
walked into the revolving propeller. The defendant was found negligent
in failing to give the plaintiff specific instructions that she was not to leave
the plane unattended. The court denied recovery because the plaintiff had
been contributorily negligent in failing to look out for her own safety.
The Berg and Williamson cases, both of which allowed recovery, based
the duty of the carrier on an analogy to railroad and street railway cases,
saying that the duty owed a passenger by an air carrier was the same as that
of any other carrier. This rule as laid down in 10 C. J. 854 (sec. 1294) is:'
1. 1931 U. S. Av. IR. 111; Kansas, Dist. Ct. Wyandotte County.
2. 1929 1. S. Av. R. 99; Massachusetts, Sup. Jud. Ct.3. 1930 U. S. Av. R. 133 (1927); Massachusetts, Super. Ct. Suffolk
County.
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. . . the general rule may be stated to be that the carrier is bound to
exercise as high a degree of skill, and diligence in receiving a passenger,
conveying him to his destination, and setting him down safely as the means
of conveyance employed and the circumstances of the case will permit."
As stated in 4 R. C. L. 1144:
"The generally accepted rule . is to the effect that carriers of pas-
sengers are bound to exercise the highest degree of care, vigilance and pre-
caution. . . . (at 1231). The duties of carriers of passengers, whether
by land or water, are not limited to the mere transportation of their
passengers. They are bound to provide safe and convenient modes of access
of departure from them, and negligence in this respect will render
the carrier liable to one injured thereby."
The cases bear these rules out. In Caley v. Kansas City,4 Reid v. Minne-
apolis St. Ry. Co.,5 Fitzgerald v. Des Moines City Ry. Co.,6 St. John v.
Connecticut Co.,7 the duty owed to passengers leaving a carrier is described
as the highest degree of care. In McCarron v. Erie Ry. Co.,8 Malser v.
Koll Transp. Co.,9 Lyons v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co.,0 Griswold v. Chicago
Rys. Co.," the rule is announced that the carrier must exercise the care
which every prudent person would use under the circumstances. A typical
case is Roden v. Connecticut Co.,' 2 where it is said that the "duty to furnish
a safe place to alight is satisfied only by the highest degree of care and
skill, reasonably expectable of intelligent and prudent persons engaged as
carriers, in view of instrumentalities employed and natural dangers."
Assuming this to be the law the only thing that can be questioned is
whether the analogy applied by the courts is a satisfactory one, considering
the difference in the types of carriers. The danger element is to be con-
sidered first, and it may be said that the danger in the air carrier is greater
since a revolving propeller is always a potential source of injury. It takes
some time for an aircraft motor to stop after the gasoline supply is cut
off, so that the danger is foreseeable and should be guarded against. An-
other factor of importance is the common knowledge of the instrumentality
being used by the carrier. We, as a nation, are coming to learn more
and more about aircraft but it can hardly be said that an airplane is as
common an instrumentality as the train. The conclusion must be that the
danger of injury to the layman is greater. There is no particular reason
from the operator's standpoint why a plane cannot be "taxied" into a posi-
tion that affords the passengers the greatest safety in emerging therefrom.
Canopies that are rolled out to the door of the plane, such as are used
by some companies, afford a way of safety to the hangar and make injuries
from a propeller an impossibility. Such precautions are not unreasonable
and are merely an aid in carrying out the duty of any carrier to its; pas-
sengers and that is supplying safety.
The real difficulty is presented, on the other hand, by airport field rules.
Despite the fact that the doors to some aircraft are on the left side of the
4. 48 S. W. (2d) 25 (1932-Missouri, Kansas City Ct. of App.).
5. 171 Minn. 31, 213 N. W. 43 (1927).
6. 201 Ia. 1302, 207 N. W. 602 (1926).
7. 103 Conn. 641, 131 A. 396 (1925).
8. 10 N. J. Misc. L. 498, 159 A. 807 (1932).
9. 156 A. 639 (1931-New Jersey, Ct. of Errors and App.).
10. 301 Pa. 499, 152 A. 687 (1930).
11. 339 Il1. 94, 170 N. E. 845 (1930).
12. 113 Conn. 408, 155 A. 721 (1931).
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plane, some airport field rules require right side parking-for purposes of
uniformity and supposed safety. Until the equipment used by aircraft
operators is uniform, as to right or left side doors, it is obvious that a
practical problem is presented to operators of equipment that, as to design,
is in the minority.
No decision dealing with the question here presented can fail to con-
sider the effect of airport field rules, in addition to the care afforded by
the operator in the" particular instance.
WILLIAM G. CAPLES.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.-[Missouri] Compensation was claimed by the
daughter of Sidney Crutcher, an inspector of the Curtis-Robertson Airplane
Manufacturing Co., who was killed in an airplane accident. Crutcher's
duties consisted of directing the activities of the inspectors and putting an
official approval on all the machines manufactured. It was also necessary
for him to sign certain "packing sheets" when a plane was completely in-
spected and ready for delivery. On some occasions Crutcher's duties re-
quired him to go into the air with the test-pilot employed to take the
finished planes from the factory to the hangar, but it was generally under-
stood that he had to obtain permission to go up. A few minutes before
the accident Crutcher was sitting in the rear seat of the plane, which the
factory had just completed, and while he was looking over the "packing
sheets," the test pilot entered. Upon being informed that the pilot was
taking the plane to the hanger deceased agreed to go along, although he
had not express permission to do so. Crutcher was killed when the plane
crashed. The "packing sheets" were found near the scene of the accident,
some of them unsigned. Held: The accident arose out of and in the course
of the employment within the meaning of the Compensation Act. Crutcher
v. Curtiss Robertson Airplane Mfg. Co. (Mo. Sup. Ct., Sept. 3, 1932) 1932
U. S. Av. R. 259.
This case gives rise to the question much litigated in compensation
cases as to when an accident arises or does not arise "out of" and "in
the course of the employment." In regard to this problem, quoting from
Wrenbury, L. J., "No recent act has provoked a larger amount of litigation
than the Workmen's Compensation Act. The few and seemingly simple
words 'arising out of and in the course of employment' have been the
fruitful source of a mass of decisions turning upon nice distinctions and
supported by refinements so subtle as to leave the mind of the reader in a
maze of confusion."
' '
There have been very few cases in air law involving the precise ques-
tion in controversy. However, a review of these cases may be somewhat
illuminating. A salesman for a baking company, who travelled in an air-
plane, distributed advertising matter, and took customers for rides at the
direction of the employer, was injured when the plane fell during a testing
flight. The court held that the accident arose "out of" his employment.
2
A pilot, while flying with passenegrs for hire, made a power dive in viola-
tion of the Air Commerce Regulations and his employer's instructions, and
1. Herbert v. Fox, A. C. 405, 419 (1916).
2. Schonberg v. Zinsmaster Baking Co., 173 Minn. 419, 217 N. W. 491
(1928).
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the accident that occurred was held not to be "in the course of" his em-
ployment. 3 For the purpose of deducing the general doctrines or formulae
that have been built up around the phrase "arising out of and in the course
of the employment" which is present in the majority of state compensa-
tion acts, it is necessary to rely on cases other than those involving avia-
tion, but the general principles evolved can be applied to the field of aviation
with little difficulty.
The test that has been generally recognized is that an injury is received
"in the course of" the employment when it comes while the workman is
doing the duty which he is employed to perform; and the injury "arises
out of the employment," where there is apparent to the rational mind
upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between
the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the
resulting injury.4
The violation of rules or instructions of the employer does not take
the employee out of the scope of his employment, where such rules relate
only to the manner of performing the tasks which he is directed expressly
or impliedly to perform.5
In the Frint Motor Car Co. case, supra, a similar situation was present,
involving the violation of an instruction of the employer. There the court
stated that, although the employee did not attempt to render the services at
the place where he was told to perform them, nevertheless he was attempt-
ing to perform a service for the employer just as truly as if he obeyed
the instructions. This same reasoning is applicable to the present case
where, despite a violation of an instruction of the company in going up in
the plane without consent, Crutcher nevertheless was performing a service
for his employer. Using the language of the general test he was doing
the duty of inspection for which he was employed, and the causal relation
between his employment and the resulting injury was quite evident.
The courts are practically unanimous in holding that the words "acci-
dent arising out of and in the course of employment," as used in com-
pensation acts should be given a broad and liberal construction in order
that the humane purpose of the enactment may be realized.6 A factor that
has influenced the courts to administer compensation acts in a liberal rather
than in a technical or metaphysical fashion is that of "capacity to bear
the loss." The courts have felt that the insurance companies with whom
the employers have insured, are better able to bear the loss than the in-
jured employee or the latter's dependants. 7
In the last analysis the question is one that must be decided alone on
the facts of each particular case, analogies from other cases not being very
helpful. In the light of the facts of this case and in accordance with the
3. Sheboygan Airways, Inc. v. Sigma Fields and Industrial Comm. of
Wis.. 1932 U. S. Av. R. 229 (Feb. 15, 1932).
4. In re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697 (1913) lMueller Construc-
tion Co. v. Indus. Bd., 283 I1. 148, 118 N. E. 1028 (1918) Heitz v. Ruppert,
218 N. Y. 148i 112 N. E. 750 (1916); AmYs v. Barton, 1 K. B. 40 (1912).
5. State ex rel. Storm v. Hought, 56 N. D. 663, 219 N. W. 213 (1928)
Milwaukee v. Industrial Comm., 160 Wis. 238, 151 N. W. 247 (1915); Print
Motor Car Co. v. Industrial Comm., 168 Wis. 436, 170 N. W. 285 (1919).
6. Eugene Dietzen Co. v. Industrial Bd., 279 Ill. 11, 116 N. E. 684, Ann.
Cas. 1918-13, 764: Holland-St. Louis Sugar Co. v. Shraluka, 64 Ind. App. 545,
116 N. E. 330 (1917).
7. E. P. Albertsworth, "Constitutionality of California Law Allowing
Compensation," 27 Ill. Law Rev. 422 (1932).
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broad interpretation which should be given the act, the result reached by
the court effectuates its humane purpose and is legally a justifiable one.
HAROLD KOVEN.
DIGESTS
CONTRACT.-[New York] Plaintiff was to be a passenger on a trans-
atlantic flight in the dirigible "Graf Zepplin." One of the conditions of his
passage thereon was his agreement not to interfere with a grant by the
operators of the Zepplin to another party of exclusive news rights covering
the flight. Plaintiff made a contract with the defendant to send to it(under the guise of messages to friends) news stories of the flight. It
does not appear whether defendant knew of the condition accompanying
plaintiff's right of passage. In a suit on the contract, defendant sets up the
fact of plaintiff's agreement with the operators as a defense. Held: that
the defense is good. Reiner v. North Am. Newspaper Alliance, 259 N. Y.
250, 181 N. E. 561, 1932 U. S. Av. Rep. 279 (1932).
The majority opinion (Hubbs, O'Brien and Crouch, JJ.) bases its
decision on the following line of argument: (1) One who wilfully and
without reasonable justification induces another to breach his contract with
a third person commits a tort; (2) The same result follows where the con-
tract with the third party is broken, not because of inducement but because
the actor has made performance by one party impossible; (3) A court will
not aid a tort-feasor to recover a benefit founded on his tortuous act.
Pound, C. J., concurred on the ground that: (1) plaintiff's act of taking
passage under the circumstances was a fraud on the operators of the
Zepplin; (2) such a tort debars him from recovery.
Crane, J., concurred on the ground that: (1) Plaintiff's conduct was a
breach of the trust imposed in him by the operators; (2) This immoral
conduct bars him from relief in a court of justice.
Lehman, J., concurred on the ground that: (1) Plaintiff was under a
general duty to refrain from inflicting wilful harm on another; (2) That
his conduct here fell withirn that classification, and (3) That a court will
not aid a wilful wrongdoer.
For discussions of the non-aviation law problems presented by this case,
consult: 19 Va. L. Rev. 79 (1932); 46 Harv. L. Rev. 158 (1932); 32 Col.
L. Rev. 1236 (1932).
ROBERT KINGSLEY.
CONTRACTS-SALEs-GUARANTY.-[New York] Plaintiff had made a
contract of sale of a Bellanca seaplane to be constructed according to
specifications. Defendant had guaranteed payment of the purchase price
up to $10,000, paying $2,000 on account. The contract called for title to
remain in the vendor until full payment was made. Plaintiff, without re-
ceiving payment, transferred title to the vendee who, for consideration, re-
transferred it to a third person. Held: (1) This transfer constituted a
material alteration of the defendant guarantor's contract and, therefore,
discharged him; (2) The contract of guaranty having been breached by
the promissee, any payments made thereon must be returned to the guar-
antor. Bellanca Aircraft Corp. v. Pere, 256 N. Y. S. 234, 235 App. Div.
89 (1932).
ROBERT KINGSLEY.
DAMAGES - WRONGFUL DEATH - AMOUNT OF VERDICT.-[New Jersey]
Plaintiffs, as administratrixes, recovered verdicts for the deaths of their
intestates as a result of an airplane accident. The defendant moved for a
new trial on the ground (inter alia) that the verdicts were excessive.
Plaintiff B recovered a verdict of $38,000. Her intestate was 37 years
of age, his wife (the plaintiff) was 28. There were no children. He left
an estate of about $28,000. Deceased's income came principally from stock
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market speculations and he had been turning over to his wife from $60 to
$100 per week. It was not shown how much these payments averaged or
how much thereof was expended for deceased's living expenses. Held:
verdict excessive insofar as it exceeds $25,000.
Plaintiff A recovered a verdict of $33,900. Her intestate was 27 years
of age, unmarried and living with his mother (the plaintiff) to whom he
turned over some $40 or $50 per week, derived from the same sources as
B's. His estate was about $25,000. Held: verdict excessive insofar as it
exceeds $15,000. Boele, Administratrix v. Colonial Western Airways, 158
Atd. 440, 1932 U. S. Av. Rep. 51 (N. J. Sup. 1932).
ROBERT KINGSLEY.
GASOLINE TAX-STORAGE OF GASOLINE USED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE.-
[Tenn., and U. S. Supreme Ct.] A Tennessee statute (Chapter 58, Acts
of 1923) imposed a tax upon all persons, corporations, etc., engaged in the
business of "selling" gasoline in the state. Chapter 67, Acts of 1925, en-
larged the scope of the law so as to include "'storers" and "distributors"
of gasoline. It provided that "storers and distributors should compute and
pay this tax on the basis of their withdrawals or distributions" and that
the tax should accrue whether such withdrawal be for sale "or other use."
The plaintiff, a non-resident corporation and common carrier, was engaged
in hauling and transporting by aeroplane from points outside the State of
Tennessee to cities within the State of Tennessee, and from points within
the state to points outside. It bought its gasoline outside of the state,
bringing it into the state and storing it in private tanks to be withdrawn
when needed. It was averred that the gasoline was not, and would not be
withdrawn from storage for any other purpose whatever. This was a suit
in equity to enjoin the collection of the tax on the ground that it imposed
a burden upon interstate commerce. Held: injunction denied. The statute
did not impose a property tax upon the gasoline, but imposed an "excise"
or "privilege" tax upon the business of storing and withdrawing the gaso-
line, the amount to be computed upon withdrawals. The storage and
withdrawal, heing completed in Tennessee, was an intrastate transaction, and
not a transaction in interstate commerce. It was a business subject to
"privilege" or "excise" tax. There is an obvious distinction between taxing
gasoline used in interstate commerce, and taxing the business of storing
within the state, and distributing or allowing the same to be withdrawn
from storage for sale "or for other use." American Airways, Inc. v. Wal-
lace et al., 57 F. (2d) 877, 1932 U. S. Av. Rep. 209 (D. C. Tenn. 1932),
discussed in 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 468, was affirmed by a per curiam
opinion of the United States Supreme Court, 53 Sup. Ct. 15, 77 L. Ed.
(Adv. Ops.) 12. (Oct. 10, 1932).
DAVID AXELROD.
INSURANcE-FIRE-INTERPRETATION OF CLAUSE "WHEN AIRCRAFT IS IN
FLIGHT."-[Federal] The plaintiff's plane was insured against "fire . . .
arising . . . while the airplane is not in flight and including loss or
damage from fire or explosion arising during, or as a result of, the start-
ing, attempting to start, or running of any engine installed in the aircraft."
On a flight from Syracuse, New York, to Florida, engine trouble developed
and an emergency landing was effected on a snow covered field. The air-
plane rolled from thirty to fifty feet, then overturned. Not more than two
minutes later a fire was discovered about the motor, a fire which com-
pletely destroyed the plane. In the ensuing action on the plaintiff's insur-
ance policy, the defendant moved to dismiss, (1) on the ground that the
loss did not fall within the provisions of the policy, and (2) that the
proximate cause of the loss was something which occurred while the plane
was in flight and, consequently, was not a risk insured under the policy.
The policy read: "The aircraft shall be deemed in flight from the time it
starts taxiing immediately prior to and for the purpose of taking off,
during the take-off, actual flight, descending, landing and taxiing immedi-
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ately after landing until it reaches a terminal or parking or mooring place"
and "the aircraft shall be deemed not in flight when in the hangar or else-
where on the ground or water, except when taxiing in flight as hereinbefore
defined." Held: by the judge, that the facts were undisputed and "did not
bring this case within the provisions of the policy covering an airplane when
not in flight." Bresee v. Automobile Insurance Company, 1932 U. S. Av. R.
53 (U. S. D. C., N. D.-N. Y., Apr. 25, 1932).
GEORGE W. BALL.
INSURANCE-INCONTESTABLE CLAUSE-EFFECT OF ON A LIMITATION FOR
ENGAGING IN AVIATION.-[New York] This action was brought by the
beneficiary of a policy of insurance issued by defendant on the life of
Wallace R. Chapin. The policy provided that during the first two years of
the policy the insured was not to take an airplane flight "otherwise than
as a passenger who is not owner of the conveyance, without the written
consent of the company and the payment of extra premiums as the company
may determine." It was further provided that "should the death of the
assured occur during the first two years of this policy directly or indirectly
as a result of his so engaging in any branch of aeronautics or of making
the aerial flights referred to above without paying the extra premium re-
quired by the company, the liability of the company shall be limited to the
return of all premiums paid." The defendant brought itself within the
provisions of the limitation by pleading that Chapin did engage in aviation
without the consent of the defendant during the proscribed two year period.
The plaintiff in its second amended reply relied upon a clause which read:
"After two full years from its date of issue this policy shall, subject to the
payment of premiums and to the terms of such disability and double in-
demnity benefit privileges (if any), as form a part of this contract, be incon-
testable." The defendant moved to strike out this part of the second
amended reply for legal insufficiency. Held: motion granted. American
Home Foundation Inc., v. Canada Life Assurance Company, 1932 U. S. Av.
R. 55 (N. Y. S. C., Spec. Term, Nov. 11, 1931).
For a discussion of the question raised by this case, see a comment on
Leidenger v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 602 (1931).
GEORGE W. BALL.
MASTER AND SERVANT.-[Arkansas] G was employed as a mechanic in
repairing an airplane belonging to one W. Needing an automobile with
which to get some materials, he secured the use of one belonging to de-
fendant. According to some testimony, G was to take defendant to a
theatre and later pick up defendant at the theatre. After leaving defendant
and while on the way to the airport with the materials, G had an accident
in which plaintiff's car was injured. Held, there is no evidence to show
that G, at the time of the accident, was on any business of the defendant
or that the relation of master and servant existed between them. Ricks v.
Sanderson, 49 S. W. (2d) 604 (Ark. 1932).
ROBERT KINGSLEY.
NEGLIGENCE-COM MON CARRIER-UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT.- [Illinois] Plain-
tiff sued for $100,000 damages for personal injuries arising out of an aero-
plane accident. The defendant's plane in the course of landing at an inter-
mediate field struck a tree about 400 feet from the edge of the field. Al-
though the field, approved by the Department of Commerce, was marked
with obstacle and boundary lights, the tree struck by the plane was not
marked by an obstruction light. On behalf of the plaintiff the court gave
the following instructions: (1) it was the duty of common carriers to do
all that human care, vigilance, and foresight can reasonably do under the
circumstances, and in view of the character of the mode of conveyance
adopted, reasonably to guard against accidents and consequential injuries,
and if they neglect so to do they are to be held strictly responsible for all
NOTES, COMMENTS, DIGESTS
consequences which flow from such neglect; that while the carrier is not
an insurer of the absolute safety of the passenger, it does, however, in legal
contemplation, undertake to exercise the highest degree of care to secure
the safety of the passenger, and is responsible for the slightest neglect re-
sulting in injury to the passenger, if the passenger is, at the time of the
injury, exercising ordinary care for her safety. . . . On behalf of the
defendant, the court instructed the jury: (8) that the defendant was not a
guarantor or insurer of the safety of the plaintiff, but that under the law
it was only required to exercise the highest degree of care in the manage-
ment and control of the aeroplane consistent with the practical operation
of the same . . .; (9) that the law does not exact or require of an
aeroplane company that its servants should be all the while upon their
guard against dangers not reasonably to be expected, or against unusual
or extraordinary occurrences, nor does it require them to conduct their busi-
ness with a degree of caution that would prevetit the practical operation of
their business; . . . (16) that it is not every accident which makes an
aeroplane company liable for damages for a personal injury. If the acci-
dent was unavoidable as far as the aeroplane company is concerned then
no liability is incurred by it. . . . Held: The jury rendered a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff for $10,000. An appeal has been taken to the
Appellate Court of Illinois. McCusker v. Curtis-Wright Flying Service, Inc.,
1932 U. S. Av. R. 100 (Circ. Ct., Cook County, Ill.).
DAVID AXELROD.
TORTs-LIBEL AND SLANDER-THEFT OF AIRPLANE.- [Virginia] Defend-
ant was the owner of an airplane, which plaintiff had been permitted to use
on several occasions. On the day in question, plaintiff claims to have been
again granted authority to use the plane. This the defendant denies. The
plane fell and was damaged. After plaintiff's refusal to pay for repairs,
defendant caused his arrest on a charge of stealing the plane. This charge
was dismissed on the preliminary hearing and plaintiff brought an action
for slander, recovering a verdict of $2,000. Held: (1) the evidence sup-
ports a finding for the plaintiff; (2) the verdict is not excessive. Weather-
ford v. Birchett, 164 S. E. 535 (Va. 1932).
ROBERT KINGSLEY.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DEATH OUTSIDE OF STATE WHERE EMPLOY-
MENT CONTRACT MADE.-[New York] An airplane pilot, while working for
a Connecticut corporation under a contract made in New York, was killed
in Connecticut while piloting an air plane from Boston, Massachusetts to
Newark, New Jersey. Held: his widow was entitled to compensation under
the New York statute on the ground that his place of employment was in
New York. Colonial Air Transport, Inc., et al. v. Tallman, and State In-
dustrial Board, 259 N. Y. 6, 234 App. Div. 809, 253 N. Y. S. 938 (no opin-
ion) affirmed (1932).
DAVID AXELROD.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION- EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE- INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR-COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.-[California] Petitioner asks the
annulment of an award of the California Industrial Accident Commission,
awarding compensation to the claimant. The District Court of Appeal
annulled the award on the ground that the relation of employer-employee
did not exist. Murray v. Industrial Accident Commission, 69 Cal. App.
Dec. 216, 10 Pac. (2d) 97 (April 7, 1932), discussed and criticized in
(1932) 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW, 470. On hearing in the Supreme Court of
California it was held, that the relation did exist and, therefore, that the
award should be affirmed. Murray v. Industrial Accident Commission, 84
Cal. Dec. 258 (Sept. 16, 1932).
The facts as stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court present a
somewhat different picture than when interpreted by the District Court
of Appeal:
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(1) The Supreme Court finds that an employer-employee relationship was
created: (a) The fact that claimant's compensation was sufficient merely to
cover his living expenses did not affect his status as an employee: "A
person may work for his board and lodging, and during such employment
he is just as much an employee as if he were paid a stipulated sum per
day, or for any other fixed period of time. The sum paid might be only
enough to pay his board and lodging, or it might be more, or even less.
The amount of wage has no bearing whatever upon the relation existing
between him and his employer." (b) Petitioner had the right to control the
manner of claimant's conduct of the flight and had, in fact, dictated the
route and given other instructions. "It is the right to exercise control,
and not the exercise of that right which determines whether the person
performing the service is an employee or an independent contractor."
(2) Since the evidence shows that petitioner was engaged (although
as a "side-line") in selling airplanes, claimant's employment was within
petitioner's business and was not casual.
(3) The evidence does not show that claimant knew that a specific
plane had been allotted to petitioner by the vendor, or that he was to fly
that particular plane only. He was directed by petitioner to accept "a"
plane of a certain model from the vendor, which he did. Consequently,
in the absence of such knowledge on the part of claimant, he cannot be
said to have departed from the scope of his employment in accepting and
flying the plane actually tendered him by the vendor.
ROBERT KINGSLEY.
